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Note 
Morally Hazardous Chemical Regulations: Why 
Effective Reform of the TSCA Requires 
Reduction of the Toxic Data Gap 
John Kvinge* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Most Americans had no idea, until relatively recently, that they were 
living so dangerously. . . . They had no idea that, without their 
knowledge or consent, they were often engaging in a grim game of 
chemical roulette whose result they would not know until many years 
later.1 
 
Many Americans believe that if a chemical is sold or used 
within the United States, it must have gone through an 
extensive battery of tests to determine its effects on health and 
the environment. Although the chemical industry is one of the 
most heavily regulated in the United States, our actual 
knowledge about many of its products is shockingly small. 
Until recently, the EPA had a full set of health and safety data 
for less than seven percent of the chemicals produced in or 
imported into the United States in quantities in excess of one 
million pounds per year.2 While recent voluntary efforts by the 
industry have filled some of the gaps in our knowledge, the 
picture is far from complete. These chemicals are found in our 
homes, our offices, our children’s toys, and in shockingly high 
quantities within our own bodies.3 The Toxic Substances 
                                                          
© 2011 John Kvinge. 
* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., 2008, Iowa 
State University. 
 1. Dr. Russell E. Train, Former Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency 1973-77, as 
quoted in S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 3 (1976). 
 2. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHEMICAL HAZARD DATA 
AVAILABILITY STUDY 2 (1998). 
 3. See generally U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, FOURTH NATIONAL 
REPORT ON HUMAN EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS (2010) (finding 
Kvinge J. Morally Hazardous Chemical Regulations: Why Effective 
Reform of the TSCA Requires Reduction of the Toxic Data Gap. 
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology. 2011;12(1):313-334. 
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Control Act (TSCA) was created in 1976 to give the EPA the 
power to investigate and regulate chemicals that were not 
covered by other laws.4 As an attempt to require testing of 
chemicals before they enter the stream of commerce, the TSCA 
has been largely a failure. It appears that Congress will 
attempt to reform or modernize the TSCA in the near future, 
and everyone—from government officials to industry executives 
and citizen activists—have proposed their thoughts on what 
the reform should look like.5 
This Note aims to examine the toxic data gap that has 
resulted from the ineffective TSCA and seeks to identify the 
features of an effective reform that would solve the data gap. 
Part I of this Note covers the history of the TSCA and compares 
some of its shortfalls to the European Union’s recently enacted 
regulatory system. Part II of this Note presents several 
proposals that would improve our knowledge of the chemicals 
in commerce. This Note concludes that the most important 
feature of any proposed reform is the provisions that give the 
EPA the power to force manufacturers to conduct testing before 
they market a chemical, and reset the TSCA inventory to give 
Americans a realistic picture of the chemical dangers present in 
their everyday life. 
                                                          
measureable levels of 212 environmental chemicals in tissue samples of test 
subjects). 
 4. S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 1 (listing the Clean Air Act, the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the 
Consumer Product Safety Act as examples of other health statutes; and 
stating, “The bill is designed to fill a number of regulatory gaps which 
currently exist”). 
 5. See, e.g., AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, 10 PRINCIPLES FOR 
MODERNIZING TSCA (2009), available at 
http://www.americanchemistry.com/TSCAPrinciples (follow “download PDF” 
hyperlink); SAFER CHEMS., HEALTHY FAMILIES COALITION, A PLATFORM FOR 
REFORM OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (2009), available at 
http://www.saferchemicals.org/PDF/SCHF_Campaign_Platform.pdf; U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES FOR REFORM OF CHEMICALS 
MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION (2009), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/existingchemicals/pubs/principles.pdf; COALITION FOR 
CHEMICAL SAFETY, ISSUES AND POLICY, 
http://www.coalitionforchemsafety.com/issues.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2010). 
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II. HISTORY OF THE TSCA AND OTHER REGULATORY 
SCHEMES 
A. ENACTING THE TSCA 
Title I of the Toxic Substances Control Act became law on 
October 11, 1976.6 Congress intended the legislation to serve as 
a method “to regulate chemical substances that present an 
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.”7 
Afterwards, Congress enacted titles II through IV to deal with 
specific toxic threats through the expansion of EPA power 
under the TSCA.8 The TSCA was not the first federal program 
created to control pollution and hazardous substances, but was 
rather intended as a gap-filler that would focus on toxic 
chemicals produced in large quantities that evaded federal 
control under other pollution and health measures.9 Initially, 
the targets of the TSCA were polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) 
and other workplace chemical hazards such as kepone, vinyl 
chloride, and asbestos.10 
A primary goal of the TSCA is the collection of test data 
about health and environmental effects caused by the 
chemicals marketed in the country.11 Congress expected that 
the provisions of the TSCA would force chemical manufacturers 
to be the primary information producing entity, and the EPA 
would act to collect and organize the results of the tests.12 To 
facilitate collection of comprehensive data, and appease 
industry opposition to a wholesale regulatory scheme, the final 
bill included many concessions that limited the EPA’s power to 
institute regulations in the absence of substantial evidence of a 
“reasonable basis to conclude” that a chemical “will present an 
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.”13 
Furthermore, any resulting regulations must be the “least 
                                                          
 6. Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 
2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2003)). 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2). 
 8. The three subtitles deal with, respectively: Asbestos Hazard 
Emergency Response, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641-2656; Indoor Radon Abatement, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 2661-2671 and Lead Exposure Reduction, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2681-2692. 
 9. S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 1. 
 10. Id. at 4. 
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (“[A]dequate data should be developed with 
respect to the effect of chemical substances and mixtures . . . development of 
such data should be the responsibility of [manufacturers].”) 
 12. S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 2. 
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a). 
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burdensome” possible.14 In practice, the EPA has been unable 
to institute regulations based on these criteria.15 
B. SPLITTING THE UNIVERSE 
To facilitate testing and cataloguing chemical health and 
safety risks, the TSCA split the universe of chemicals into two 
distinct categories: chemicals currently in production at the 
time the law took effect (existing chemicals) and potential new 
chemicals that companies were considering manufacturing for 
the first time.16 Existing chemicals became part of the TSCA 
inventory, and absent a specific regulation, any company was 
free to produce or import that chemical provided they complied 
with other laws. Furthermore, no testing was required for 
existing chemicals.17 The TSCA inventory initially contained 
about 61,000 “existing” chemicals reported to the EPA by 
manufacturers between 1975 and 1978.18 New chemicals (other 
than those for exempted uses) undergo a review process, and if 
the EPA does not find a reason to regulate or prohibit them, 
they are added to the inventory.19 
The process of adding a non-exempt new chemical to the 
TSCA inventory starts with a Pre-Manufacture Notice (PMN). 
A PMN must be completed at least ninety days before the 
manufacturer intends to begin importing or producing the 
chemical.20 The PMN requires basic information about 
chemical properties, uses, production levels, and expected 
                                                          
 14. Id. 
 15. Of the more than 83,000 chemicals contained in the TSCA inventory, 
the EPA has placed controls on only nine under TSCA. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION: OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 10 (2009). 
 16. See David Brownfield, Reform of U.S. Chemicals Regulations May Not 
Be out of REACH, 21 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 223, 227 
(2008). 
 17. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION: 
APPROACHES IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 4 
(2005); see also Sarah Bayko, Reforming the Toxic Substances Control Act to 
Protect America’s Most Precious Resource, 14 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 245, 
266 (2006) (noting that the EPA “required testing for fewer than 200” of the 
62,000 chemicals in commerce when the EPA began reviewing chemicals). 
 18. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OVERVIEW: OFFICE OF POLLUTION 
PREVENTION AND TOXICS PROGRAMS 5 (2007). 
 19. Id. at 8. 
 20. Id. at 7. 
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exposures.21 Additionally, the manufacturer must provide any 
health and safety data, but only to the extent that the data is 
in their possession or “reasonably ascertainable.”22 This is the 
greatest criticism of the TSCA and its ultimate downfall.23 
Because there are no minimum health and safety tests required 
prior to marketing a new chemical under TSCA, most 
manufacturers choose not to conduct any testing, and submit 
their PMN absent any test data at all. In 2005, about fifteen 
percent of PMNs included a full set of basic toxicity data for 
health and safety.24 
If the PMN includes less than a full set of data, the options 
available to the EPA during the 90-day review process are 
significantly limited. Although the EPA has the ability to 
request additional testing on a product it believes may pose a 
threat to health or the environment, in order to make that 
request, the EPA must have enough information that 
demonstrates a potential risk or extensive exposure.25 In the 
instances where a PMN is submitted without any testing, 
making even an initial determination of risk or exposure is 
extremely difficult. Since the TSCA was enacted in 1976, the 
EPA has required additional testing for only 200 chemicals.26 
When possible, the EPA relies on Structure-Activity 
Relationship analysis to attempt to predict the physical 
properties and health and environment effects of an untested 
chemical.27 Each year, the EPA receives around 1500 PMNs,28 
and about half of the chemicals identified enter production and 
                                                          
 21. Id. 
 22. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION: 
COMPARISON OF U.S. AND RECENTLY ENACTED EUROPEAN UNION APPROACHES 
TO PROTECT AGAINST THE RISKS OF TOXIC CHEMICALS 7 (2007). 
 23. See Rachel Rawlins, Teething on Toxins: In Search of Regulatory 
Solutions for Toys and Cosmetics, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (2009). 
 24. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION: 
OPTIONS EXIST TO IMPROVE EPA’S ABILITY TO ASSESS HEALTH RISKS AND 
MANAGE ITS CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM 11 (2005). 
 25. See Richard A. Denison, Ten Essential Elements in TSCA Reform, 39 
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10020, 10020 (2009) (“In what amounts to a 
classic Catch-22, government must already have information sufficient to 
document potential risk, or at the very least, extensive exposure, in order to 
require the development of information sufficient to determine whether there 
is actual risk.”). 
 26. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 15. 
 27. Id. at 8. 
 28. Id. 
121_KVINGE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2011  8:08 AM 
318 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 12:1 
 
 
enter the TSCA inventory.29 The other half are voluntarily 
withdrawn, frequently following the threat of EPA action.30 
Today, the inventory contains upwards of 82,000 distinct 
chemicals.31 
C. GAPS IN THE KNOWLEDGE 
Although the TSCA database is large, it is far from 
comprehensive. A majority of the chemicals it contains are 
“existing” chemicals left over from the initial population of the 
inventory in 1976.32 Many of these chemicals are no longer in 
production, and have been replaced by (hopefully) safer and 
more effective alternatives.33 In 1998, the EPA released a study 
on High Production Volume (HPV) chemicals.34 HPV chemicals 
are produced or imported into the United States in excess of 
1,000,000 lbs per year.35 The EPA identified nearly 3000 HPV 
chemicals, and concluded that no publicly-available toxicity 
information existed for 43% of the HPV chemicals, and a full 
set of basic toxicity data existed for only 7%.36 In an effort to 
remedy this shocking knowledge deficit, the EPA and chemical 
industry completed the HPV Challenge, an effort to create data 
for more than 2,200 of the HPV chemicals.37 As the program 
reaches its conclusion in 2010, evaluation of its success is 
mixed. The EPA portrays the challenge as a huge success, but 
critics point to the remaining gaps in data and lack of 
transparency in reporting results.38 
Even if the EPA has a full picture of what applications of 
its product a chemical producer anticipates at the time the 
chemical is added to the TSCA inventory, there can be 
                                                          
 29. Id. at 10 tbl.1.3. 
 30. Id. at  9–11. 
 31. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 24, at 2. 
 32. Id. 
 33. The EPA admits that it does not have a complete picture of what 
chemicals are actually used in the country. A plan was created to reset the 
inventory, but it was put on hold pending a serious overhaul of the TSCA. See 
TSCA Inventory Reset, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/champ/pubs/hpv/tsca.html (last updated Apr. 29, 2010). 
 34. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2. 
 35. See id. at 2. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 30–33. 
 38. See RICHARD A. DENISON, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND’S 
COMMENTS ON CHAMP 5 (2008). 
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significant changes over time, as different uses are discovered, 
or different end-users begin incorporating the chemical in their 
business.39 To attempt to gauge these changes and update the 
inventory, the EPA created the Inventory Update Rule (IUR) in 
1977 using its section 8(a) powers under the TSCA.40 The EPA 
has since amended the IUR, the most recent change coming 
into effect in 2006.41 The IUR presently requires manufacturers 
producing 25,000 pounds or more of certain chemicals to 
provide basic manufacturing information to the EPA every five 
years.42 Manufacturers producing more than 300,000 pounds 
have additional reporting requirements.43 In a problem that 
mirrors the initial reporting requirements for PMNs, IUR 
reports only require information that the manufacturers 
consider is “readily obtainable.”44 In the 2006 IUR summary, of 
the 2118 chemicals that reported commercial or consumer uses, 
814 claimed determining if their product was intended for 
children was “Not Readily Obtainable.”45 The EPA readily 
admits that because of “Not Readily Obtainable” responses, 
“the reported industrial processing and use information 
represents an undercounting of the actual processing and use 
situations in the United States.”46 Furthermore, “companies 
reporting under the IUR might have incomplete knowledge of 
the processing and/or use of their chemicals.”47 If the producers 
of a chemical do not have a complete picture of how their 
product is being used, it seems unlikely that someone else does. 
D. PARALYZED WITH (A LACK OF) DOUBT 
The data gap is not only dangerous because of the lack of 
practical knowledge, but it causes significant headaches for the 
EPA when attempting to promulgate regulations on chemicals 
that it has good reason to suspect are dangerous. Two 
frequently-quoted examples come from the judicial decisions in 
                                                          
 39. See generally Denison, supra note 25, at 10024-26. 
 40. TSCA Inventory Reset, supra note 33. 
 41. See Denison, supra note 25, at 10024-25. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2006 INVENTORY UPDATE REPORTING: 
DATA SUMMARY 31 (2008). 
 46. Id. at 12. 
 47. Id. 
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Chemical Manufacturers Association v. EPA48 and Corrosion 
Proof Fittings v. EPA.49 In both cases, the Fifth Circuit ruled 
that the EPA had insufficient data to justify the action they 
were taking—requiring testing for isopropyl benzene in 
Chemical Manufacturers and banning asbestos in Corrosion 
Proof. 
In Chemical Manufacturers, although manufacturers and 
processors released nearly three million pounds of isopropyl 
benzene into the atmosphere each year, and produced more 
than three billion pounds of the chemical each year, very little 
was known about the carcinogenic effects of the chemical.50 
Because isopropyl benzene was “produced in substantial 
quantities,” and its use created the “potential for substantial 
human exposure.” The EPA issued a final test rule that 
required manufacturers to perform testing on “health effects, 
environmental effects, and chemical fate.”51 The chemical 
manufacturers sued, and the Fifth Circuit agreed that the EPA 
had not articulated a standard to determine when exposure to 
isopropyl benzene was “substantial.”52 As a result, before the 
EPA can require additional data, they must set a standard for 
exposure, but before the EPA can set a standard for exposure, 
they need additional data.53 The high burden of proof that must 
be met to promulgate a rule, combined with the underreporting 
of information from the manufacturers meant the EPA 
essentially was unable to require manufactures to conduct tests 
against their will.54 
Corrosion Proof Fittings spelled the end of the EPA’s 
attempts to institute significant rulemaking efforts that are not 
explicitly supported by industry.55 Although the EPA based 
their ban on asbestos on more than “45,000 pages of analyses, 
comments, testimony, correspondence, and other materials,”56 
                                                          
 48. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 899 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 49. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 50. Cumene; Final Test Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 28195, 28196 (July 27, 1988) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 799). 
 51. Id. at 28195. 
 52. 899 F.2d at 360. 
 53. See Robert B. Haemer, Reform of the Toxic Substances Control Act: 
Achieving Balance in the Regulation of Toxic Substances, 6 ENVTL. LAW. 99, 
116 (1999). 
 54. Id.; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 24, at 18. 
 55. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 18-20. 
 56. Asbestos: Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in 
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the Fifth Circuit largely vacated the rule on the basis that “the 
EPA has failed to support its ban with the substantial evidence 
needed to provide it with a reasonable basis.”57 After such 
significant and costly setbacks, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
in the thirty-three year history of the TSCA, the EPA has 
banned only five of the substances originally contained on the 
inventory, and placed controls on four new chemicals under 
section 5(f).58 
This article opened with a quote by Dr. Russell E. Train, 
the administrator of the EPA during the inception of the TSCA. 
The Senate cited Dr. Train’s comments about the ignorance of 
Americans regarding the dangers of chemicals present in their 
everyday life as a strong motivation for the passage of the 
TSCA.59 Sadly, it appears thirty-three years later the situation 
has not significantly improved, and most Americans assume 
that because a chemical is allowed to be produced in the 
country, it must have passed a battery of tests to prove its 
safety. While this is true for a number of substances, such as 
pesticides, drugs, food, and cosmetics, these categories do not 
cover even a majority of the chemicals that Americans come in 
contact with on a daily basis. The regulatory gap that spawned 
the TSCA remains today. 
The controversy over Bisphenol A (BPA) in 2008 is a 
perfect example of the faith the American people have in the 
regulatory ability of the US government, and their shock when 
they realize how little regulation actually occurs. Produced in 
quantities exceeding two billion pounds in 2004, BPA is 
frequently used in the manufacture of polycarbonate and epoxy 
resins.60 The chemical entered the national lexicon in 2008 
when it became known that the FDA had ignored significant 
safety concerns when evaluating the health effects of BPA that 
leeched into food and beverages from plastic containers.61 
                                                          
Commerce Prohibitions; Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 29460, 29461 (July 12, 1989) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763). 
 57. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1226 (5th Cir. 1991). 
The ban is still effective with regard to new products using asbestos. See U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 19. 
 58. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 10 n.3. 
 59. S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 3 (1976). 
 60. See Bisphenol A Global Indus. Grp., Bisphenol A: Information Sheet 
(October 2002), http://www.bisphenol-
a.org/pdf/DiscoveryandUseOctober2002.pdf. 
 61. See, e.g., Julie Scelfo, F.D.A. to Reconsider Plastic Bottle Risk, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2008, at D3. 
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Consumer backlash against products containing BPA led the 
six largest manufacturers of baby bottles to offer BPA free 
versions of their products, and led to a ban on BPA in children’s 
products in Canada and several states.62 
Furthermore, while the TSCA has one of the largest 
universes of chemicals to regulate, it has one of the smallest 
staffs and budgets of federal regulatory programs.63 As a point 
of comparison, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) regulates approximately 700 
pesticides used in America each year.64 The FIFRA operates on 
a licensing scheme, where a producer must prove safety of their 
product and be granted a license before the EPA allows 
distribution. In 2008, the Office of Pollution Prevention and 
Toxics (which administers the TSCA) had an operating budget 
of about $50 million for TSCA activity, and a staff of about 270 
people.65 Also in 2008, the FIFRA, in contrast, had a budget of 
about $160 million and a staff of over 900 people.66 The FIFRA 
has a budget over three times greater to police a chemical 
universe less than one percent of the size of the TSCA.67 
E. OTHER EXAMPLES 
The European Union recently enacted legislation known as 
Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals 
(REACH).68 It took effect on June 1, 2007, and in many ways, 
represents the antithesis of the TSCA program.69 Unlike the 
TSCA, REACH creates no distinction between “new” and 
“existing” chemicals; every chemical produced or imported into 
                                                          
 62. See Denise Grady & Gardiner Harris, U.S. Concerned About The Risks 
From A Plastic, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2010, at A3. 
 63. See Mark A. Greenwood, TSCA Reform: Building a Program that can 
Work, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS (SPECIAL ISSUE) 10034, 10036 
(2009). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Lynn L. Bergeson, Chemical Regulation: Preparing to Address the 
Challenges Ahead, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS (SPECIAL ISSUE)10029 
(2009). See generally European Commission Environment Directorate General, 
REACH in Brief (2007). 
 69. See John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH: Practical 
Principles for Chemical Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 741–44 
(2008). 
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the EU in sufficient quantities faces the same regulatory 
process.70 Because REACH is based on the chemicals that are 
actually used in the EU, its universe is expected to be 
significantly smaller, around 30,000 unique substances, or just 
a little over a third of the size of the TSCA inventory.71 
According to the quantity of the chemical produced and its 
known hazards, every manufacturer must submit technical 
data along with their request for registration.72 Chemicals 
known to be safe, and those produced in small quantities have 
the lowest reporting requirement, but manufacturers are still 
required to produce detailed information about the chemical 
properties, expected uses, and safe handling requirements for 
their product.73 Chemicals produced in larger quantities, and 
those that present biological or environmental hazards are 
required to undergo significant testing before REACH will 
authorize their use.74 Further requirements are in place for 
downstream users to report their uses to their suppliers, and 
REACH encourages information sharing among governments 
and industry to create a complete picture of the exposure and 
uses present for each chemical.75 REACH also includes 
significant regulatory authority, requiring evaluation and 
authorization for most chemicals before they reach the 
market.76 REACH places the burden on manufacturers, for the 
most part, to prove their product’s safety before distribution is 
allowed.77 According to some estimates, high production volume 
chemicals (100 metric tons or more) will have to undergo an 
average of forty-eight tests before marketing under REACH, 
compared to just fourteen voluntary tests under the TSCA.78 
                                                          
 70. Id. at 743–44. 
 71. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE GENERAL, 
supra note 68, at 9. 
 72. See Applegate, supra note 69, at 744–45. 
 73. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE GENERAL, 
supra note 68, at 6–10. 
 74. REACH encourages non-animal testing to the extent possible, and 
encourages companies with similar chemicals to pool resources and share 
data. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE GENERAL, 
supra note 68, at 10. 
 75. EUROPEAN COMMISSION ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE GENERAL, supra 
note 68, at 8, 11. 
 76. See Applegate, supra note 69, at 744. 
 77. Applegate, supra note 69, at 745–46. 
 78. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 22, at 17. 
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F. CALLS FOR REFORM 
Although calls for reform of the TSCA have been present 
for nearly all of its thirty-three year history, there has never 
been a significant revision to the substance of the TSCA.79 The 
last significant attempt was the Kid Safe Chemical Act (KSCA), 
proposed in 2005 by Senators Frank Lautenberg and Jim 
Jeffords.80 The KSCA would have given the EPA additional 
power to use the TSCA to regulate the industry to protect 
sensitive sub-populations, especially children, from exposure to 
chemicals that were known to be hazardous or that had not 
been significantly tested.81 Replacing the “unreasonable risk” 
standard, the KSCA would have allowed the EPA to regulate 
chemicals that did not present a “reasonable certainty of no 
harm.”82 Critics of the reform dismissed this standard as 
unworkable and unattainable.83 
With the change in leadership in Washington in 2009, talk 
began again about the necessity of reforming or modernizing 
the TSCA. On September 29, 2009, EPA Administrator Lisa P. 
Jackson released a document entitled “Essential Principles for 
Reform of Chemicals Management Legislation.”84 In her speech 
at the California Commonwealth Club announcing the 
principals, Administrator Jackson acknowledged the 
shortcomings of the current implementation of the TSCA and 
asked Congress to come up with legislation to resolve those 
problems.85 
Industry has also been a vocal proponent of modernization 
of the TSCA. Coinciding with the EPA’s drive for reform, the 
American Chemistry Council released its own set of ten 
                                                          
 79. Greenwood, supra note 63, at 10034 (“TSCA is one of the oldest 
federal environmental statutes that has never seen substantial reform.”). 
 80. Kid Safe Chemicals Act, S. 1391, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4308, 109th 
Cong. (2005). 
 81. See S. 1391§ 2(b). 
 82. S. 1391 § 503(a)(1). 
 83. See, e.g., SOC’Y OF CHEM. MFRS. AND ASSOCIATES, SOCMA POSITION 
ON REFORMING THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (2009), available at 
http://www.socma.com/assets/file/socma1/PDFfiles/GR_PDF_files/SOCMA-
Position-on-TSCA-031909.pdf (describing the reasonable certainty of no harm 
standard as “arguably . . . impossible to meet”). 
 84. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 5. 
 85. Adm’r Lisa P. Jackson, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Remarks to the 
Commonwealth Club of San Francisco (Sept. 29, 2009) (transcript available on 
EPA web site). 
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principles for modernizing the TSCA.86 Notably, the American 
Chemistry Council supports a regulatory scheme that requires 
manufacturers to conduct additional testing to allow the EPA 
to make confident decisions about safety.87 Composed of over 
150 businesses, trade organizations, and manufactures, the 
Coalition for Chemical Safety represents the strongest industry 
voice calling for reform.88 According to the Coalition for 
Chemical Safety Blog, they have four guiding principles that all 
of the members agree upon: “[1.] Our country is long past due 
for an overhaul of its chemical safety laws; [2.] Any such 
overhaul should put safety first; [3.] It should also be a law that 
encourages American industrial innovation; and, [4.] It should 
protect American jobs.”89 
Thus with support from government, industry, and 
citizens, it is only a matter of time before a proposal is brought 
before Congress. In the meantime, the EPA has been testing 
the limits of its authority, establishing a “chemicals of concern” 
list and action plans that may place restrictions on phthalates, 
short-chain chlorinated paraffins, polybrominated diphenyl 
ethers (PBDEs), and perfluorinated chemicals.90 The EPA has 
also been encouraging manufacturers of other dangerous 
chemicals to voluntarily phase out use and distribution.91 
III. ANALYSIS 
As Congress holds hearings on reform and toxic chemicals, 
it is important to consider the essential elements of a reform 
that would give the EPA the necessary authority and oversight 
to ensure that the chemicals in the United States are safe and 
effective. If any reform is going to be effective, it has to learn 
from the mistakes of the past and remedy the shortfalls of the 
current version of the TSCA. 
                                                          
 86. AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, supra note 5. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See generally About Us, COALITION FOR CHEMICAL SAFETY, 
http://coalitionforchemsafety.com/aboutus.aspx (last visited Sept. 6, 2010) 
(describing the organization and providing a list of Coalition members). 
 89. Who is CCS?, COALITION FOR CHEMICAL SAFETY, 
http://blog.coalitionforchemsafety.com/2010/02/who-is-ccs/ (last visited Sept. 6, 
2010). 
 90. Elizabeth Grossman, What the EPA’s “Chemicals of Concern” Plans 
Really Mean, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Jan. 11, 2010), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=epa-chemicals-of-concern-
plans. 
 91. See id. 
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First, reform must reset the chemical inventory and ensure 
that no chemical is given a free pass solely because it is already 
in production. Second, a reformed TSCA should place the 
primary burden on manufacturers to prove the safety of their 
product by imposing requirements for minimum initial testing 
before a substance is added to the inventory and approved for 
sale. Third, the data that results from increased testing must 
be shared with states and other agencies so that they can 
determine what, if any, additional regulations are required to 
keep us safe. Fourth, a reformed TSCA must provide benefits to 
manufacturers who conduct sufficient testing and produce 
innovative and safe chemicals for consumer and industrial use. 
Finally, the TSCA must establish a standard of review that 
takes advantage of the new influx of information and allows for 
flexibility in regulation. 
A. FIRST STEPS: IT MAKES SENSE TO RESET THE CHEMICAL 
INVENTORY, AND PRIORITIZE THE EPA’S INVESTIGATION 
In 1976, there were approximately 61,000 existing 
chemicals in commerce when the TSCA came into effect.92 As 
existing chemicals, no additional testing was required before 
companies who manufactured these chemicals began to 
distribute their product, often in shockingly large quantities.93 
While a lot has changed over the last thirty-four years, the 
inventory has not been updated to reflect these changes.94 Over 
20,000 new chemicals have been added to the inventory, and 
other chemicals that were in wide use during the 1970s have 
dropped out of use completely.95 As a method for explaining the 
number and types of chemicals that are in actual use in the 
United States today, the TSCA inventory is a complete failure. 
A primary element that will be a part of any successful 
reform of the TSCA is an inventory reset. An inventory reset is 
not a new proposal.96 The EPA announced a plan to reset the 
inventory in March of 2008 but discontinued the plan when it 
became apparent that a complete overhaul of the system was in 
                                                          
 92. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 5. 
 93. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 4, 7, 11. 
 94. Jackson, supra note 85. 
 95. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BACKGROUND DISCUSSION PIECE: EPA’S 
TSCA INVENTORY RESET 1, 3 (2008), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/champ/pubs/hpv/INV_Reset_112508.pdf. 
 96. Id. 
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the works.97 By purging the TSCA inventory and re-creating a 
new inventory that reflects the actual and intended uses of 
chemicals that are produced in or imported into the United 
States, the EPA will actually be able to reduce its workload 
when it comes time to evaluate the chemicals contained in a 
new inventory. All manufacturers and importers should be 
required to provide a list of all chemicals that they are 
producing, using, or importing in a given period (perhaps three 
years as was used for the original TSCA inventory) along with 
an approximate quantity of each chemical. In this way, the 
EPA will be able to prioritize their investigations based on the 
quantity of the substance in use in a given year. Old substances 
that are no longer in use have no place in the inventory. If a 
company wishes to use a discontinued substance in the future, 
they will be required to provide testing data for the chemical 
just as if it is a new discovery. 
An inventory reset might be combined with a sunset clause 
on any chemical that is not used for more than a decade to 
ensure that the new TSCA inventory remains relevant. As time 
passes, we learn more about risks from substances that were 
considered harmless in the past.98 Without continual 
monitoring of the substances we produce and release, their 
hazardous effects on our body and our environment take us by 
surprise. 
The biggest advantage of an inventory reset would be the 
opportunity for the EPA to take another bite at the apple of 
regulation for some specific chemicals. Many of the 61,000 
original chemicals are no longer produced and have not been 
evaluated for health and safety in the last decade, but a 
company could decide tomorrow to once again begin 
manufacturing the chemical in large quantities.99 Assuming 
they were not going to use the chemical for a new purpose, the 
EPA would not have any significant ability to require new 
testing or prevent the company from going forward because the 
substance is already contained on the TSCA inventory. 
An inventory reset and retesting requirement would not be 
a heavy burden on industry either. Thanks to the success of the 
EPA’s High Production Volume Challenge, most companies 
                                                          
 97. Id. 
 98. For a particularly shocking tale about the hazards of a popular 
microwaveable snack, see Andrew Scott Dulberg, The Popcorn Lung Case 
Study: A Recipe for Regulation?, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 87 (2009). 
 99. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 95. 
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have relatively complete data about the health and safety 
effects of their most common products.100 Additionally, because 
the European Union will have had their REACH program in 
effect for nearly half a decade by the time new legislation would 
take effect, most of the chemicals will have been tested under 
the REACH standards for safety already.101 In the current 
system, companies that refuse to test or that under-test their 
products are given a huge benefit, while companies that are 
committed to fully ensuring the safety of their product spend 
millions on testing and are only rewarded with more regulatory 
hoops to jump through.102 An effective regulatory program 
should not encourage willful ignorance about health and safety, 
regardless of how long a product has been on the market. 
B. SHIFTING THE BURDEN: A REFORMED TSCA SHOULD PLACE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVE SAFETY IN THE HANDS OF THE 
MANUFACTURER, BY REQUIRING MANUFACTURERS TO CONDUCT 
INITIAL TESTING OF THEIR PRODUCT 
Under the current system, manufacturers are not required 
to conduct product testing before submitting their application 
to the EPA.103 Because the EPA relies in part on the data sent 
by a manufacturer to determine if there are health or safety 
concerns that warrant additional testing, manufacturers who 
believe they might have a dangerous product are actually given 
incentives not to test under the current system.104 While the 
EPA has the ability to test a product themselves, they do not 
have the resources or the knowledge of a manufacturer, and at 
current funding levels would not be capable of testing every 
product submitted to them.105 
From a logistical standpoint, it makes the most sense to 
have manufacturers conduct their own testing. Manufacturers 
have the greatest interest in seeing their product come on the 
market, and they also have the best idea about the intended 
uses for their product and how much they intend to produce. 
Requiring manufacturers to conduct tests would equitably 
                                                          
 100. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 30–33. 
 101. See Bergeson, supra note 68, at 10030. 
 102. See Wendy Wagner, Using Competition-Based Regulation to Bridge 
the Toxics Data Gap, 83 IND. L.J. 629, 630 (2008). 
 103. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 24, at 11. 
 104. See Wagner, supra note 102, at 630. 
 105. See Greenwood, supra note 63, at 10036. 
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distribute the cost of comprehensive testing between the 
manufacturers who produce the product and the companies 
who use the chemicals in the greatest quantity. 
From a legal standpoint, some courts have recently held 
that manufacturers have a duty to test their product under the 
common law—apart from the extremely limited duties imposed 
by the TSCA. The Fifth Circuit has been the most vocal 
proponent of common law responsibility to test, stating that “a 
manufacturer has a duty to test and inspect his product. . . . A 
product must not be made available to the public without 
disclosure of those dangers that the application of reasonable 
foresight would reveal.”106 Unfortunately, proving that a 
manufacturer has violated their common law duty to test is 
more difficult when the manufacturer completes insufficient 
testing, because first a plaintiff must prove that they were 
damaged by the product, which is nearly impossible without 
full testing.107 
A common concern those opposed to mandatory testing 
have is control over trade secrets and confidentiality.108 
Producers claim that in the process of providing all of the 
health and safety data to the EPA they would be forced to 
divulge trade secrets that would give their competitors an 
unfair advantage. According to some estimates, nearly 95% of 
Potential Manufacture Notices include significant restrictions 
on the data they contain because they are identified as 
confidential business information.109 Apart from the dubious 
quality of the argument that preserving trade secrets is worth 
risking the health and safety of millions of people, there are 
plenty of safeguards available to ensure that confidential 
business information can stay protected while potential safety 
risks are disclosed. It is reasonable for a company to want 
protection of their sensitive information for a period while 
patents are acquired or experimental procedures are tested, but 
allowing wholesale permanent exclusion of confidential 
business information causes far more harm to our safety 
knowledge than the benefit it provides to the company. 
Companies should be allowed to request confidential business 
information protection for specific information and for a limited 
                                                          
 106. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1090 (5th Cir. 
1973). 
 107. Wagner, supra note 102, at 636. 
 108. See Denison, supra note 25, at 10027. 
 109. Id. 
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period. Furthermore, they must be required to provide 
justification for their requests, or inappropriate confidential 
business information requests will continue. 
Finally, for industry to support a reform that requires 
them to conduct additional testing, there must be advantages 
for the manufacturers that embrace their responsibilities. One 
possible enticement might be a limit on the liability of a 
manufacturer who completes the most rigorous tests on their 
product.110 If a manufacturer completes a full battery of tests 
and submits the results to the EPA for the public to see, they 
could be granted a cap on their liability for torts arising from 
that product. Toxic torts are one of the most expensive 
potential liabilities that a company exposes themselves to, and 
they would likely jump at the chance to limit their exposure.111 
Furthermore, complete testing data would allow the EPA to 
have the information they need to regulate the use and 
availability of a product, and inform the public about the risks 
of a chemical and proper procedures to limit that risk. 
C. SHARING THE FRUITS OF OUR LABOR: A REFORMED TSCA 
MUST ENSURE HEALTH AND SAFETY RISK DATA IS SHARED 
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONALLY 
After the EPA creates a new chemical inventory and the 
chemicals it contains are subjected to extensive testing to 
ensure their safety, the question remains of what to do with the 
information contained in the inventory. There are two opposing 
options: preserve the secrecy of the data, or publish it freely for 
the use of the public. For reasons I will explain, the success and 
efficiency of the system requires that the chemical inventory 
data become publicly available without restrictions. 
If the inventory data is protected and access to the 
information within is restricted, companies may feel more 
confident about submitting their data. They could be sure that 
their internal tests could not be “blown out of proportion” by 
consumers or the media, and they would know that their 
competitors could not use their own studies against them. 
Furthermore, a closed system of confidential test results would 
                                                          
 110. See Haemer, supra note 53, at 133. 
 111. Robert Haemer points out that a similar program is in place for 
nuclear power generators through the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 
(1994). Haemer, supra note 53, at 133. 
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cure any free rider problems. The first company to test a 
common substance incurs a large expense. In a system with 
freely available information, the original company’s competitors 
can rely on the first test results to obtain approval for their 
product as well, without spending the money to conduct the 
tests themselves. A closed system, on the other hand, provides 
incentives for a company to conduct tests early and enjoy a 
monopoly on the market until a competitor can complete their 
own tests. Furthermore, companies would not have to be 
concerned about the security of their confidential business 
information. 
On the other hand, a public and open chemical inventory 
would help to encourage confidence among consumers of 
chemicals. Anyone could log on to a central clearinghouse and 
get the full test results for a chemical they were considering 
using in their product, and have a complete picture of the level 
of safety the product they were considering would provide. 
Companies would be encouraged to conduct additional testing 
on their competitors’ products, because if they could prove that 
a competitor had a product that was less safe or incompletely 
tested, they would enjoy a preference in a market that 
increasingly desires comprehensive information about the 
safety and health risks of various substances.112 An open 
system could still provide protection for confidential business 
information, but consumers who have a preference for 
knowledge of their products may prefer the substance that has 
complete disclosure of risks, and disfavor products that are 
covered by extensive claims of trade secrets. 
An open system has the added advantage of allowing easy 
collaboration between the EPA, and state and national 
governments. Cooperation with REACH, the European Union’s 
chemical control program, will be essential to prevent 
duplication of efforts and allow thorough investigation of the 
properties of chemicals in the inventory. Keeping with the 
principles of federalism present in our government, individual 
states should be allowed to enact controls over substances of 
concern that the EPA chooses not to attempt to regulate. If 
other agencies and governments can be trusted to maintain the 
security of any confidential information contained within the 
inventory, there is no reason to deny them access. 
                                                          
 112. See Wagner, supra note 102, at 640. 
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D. ENCOURAGING INNOVATION: WHY STRONGER CONTROLS 
WILL NOT STIFLE INVENTION AND PROGRESS 
Rather than stifling innovation, a new regulatory scheme 
under a reformed TSCA will encourage new developments. 
Currently, existing chemicals enjoy a favored status under the 
TSCA. Because they are not subject to extensive testing for 
safety, an existing chemical may be an appealing choice for a 
company looking for a solution to a problem.113 However, the 
premise that an existing chemical is automatically safer than a 
newly developed substitute has repeatedly been discredited.114 
If a reformed TSCA requires all chemicals to be tested, the bias 
towards existing chemicals could easily disappear if there are 
promising green replacements available. 
Furthermore, the rapid pace of nanomaterial development 
requires a new approach to the new vs. existing chemical 
distinction. Carbon is carbon is carbon, as far as the TSCA is 
concerned. Nanomaterials, however, are engineered substances 
often produced from a single element (gold, or carbon, or 
silicon, for example).115 The physical structure of these 
substances is on the molecular scale, and the arrangement of 
the molecules that constitute them has a direct impact on the 
potential health effects of the nanomaterials on humans. There 
is evidence that small carbon nanotubes may act similarly to 
asbestos fibers if inhaled,116 but in the eyes of the current 
TSCA, the nanotubes are no more dangerous than the graphite 
in a pencil lead. 
E. CHOOSING AN APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW: WHY 
THE KID SAFE CHEMICAL ACT’S PROPOSED “REASONABLE 
CERTAINTY OF NO HARM” STANDARD IS UNWORKABLE AND 
UNDESIRABLE FOR A REFORMED TSCA 
As mentioned before, a previous proposal to reform the 
TSCA was Senator Frank Lautenberg’s Kid Safe Chemical Act 
(KSCA). The KSCA attempted to replace the TSCA’s 
                                                          
 113. See Bayko, supra note 17, at 254–55. 
 114. The EPA calls this phenomenon “new chemical bias.” See U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, Regulation of New Chemicals and Chemicals Already on the 
Market, US EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oppt/newchems/pubs/newvexist.htm (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
 115. See Albert C. Lin, Size Matters: Regulating Nanotechnology, 31 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 361–63 (2007). 
 116. Id. at 360 n.72. 
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“unreasonable risk” standard with a more stringent 
requirement of a “reasonable certainty of no harm.”117 The goal 
of the KSCA was to reverse the inquiry: rather than requiring 
the EPA to prove that a chemical presented an unreasonable 
risk before allowing regulation, the manufacturer had to certify 
that their testing showed there was a reasonable certainty of 
no harm. Industry executives roundly decried this standard as 
unworkable and unrealistic.118 Furthermore, the Act only 
required the chemical to be certified based on available 
knowledge.119 Under the KSCA, just as under the TSCA, a 
company might attempt to plead ignorance regarding the 
effects of their chemical. Thus, a company could claim that, to 
their knowledge, there was a reasonable certainty of no harm if 
the testing to actually determine the safety of their product was 
too expensive or difficult to complete. The KSCA, in some cases, 
would have given the illusion of safety when in reality the 
necessary tests had not been completed. 
REACH, in contrast, does not create a threshold inquiry at 
all. Rather, REACH encourages manufacturers to be proactive 
in evaluating the benefits and drawbacks of their product.120 If 
there are readily available substitutes to a potentially 
dangerous chemical, then REACH requires the manufacturer 
and users to use the substitute, unless they can present a 
compelling justification for the continued use of the more 
dangerous product. The goal of an effective regulatory scheme 
should not be to set a minimum floor for safety or a ceiling for 
toxicity, but rather to provide the tools for a comprehensive, 
individualized determination of the economic, social, and 
health effects of allowing the sale, manufacture, and import of 
a certain chemical. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The time is right for reform of the TSCA. It is politically 
popular, supported by industry, and aligned with regulatory 
initiatives in the European Union as well. The TSCA in its 
current form is ineffective and inaccurate. It gives the 
                                                          
 117. Kid Safe Chemicals Act, S. 1391, 109th Cong. § 503(a)(1) (2005); Kid 
Safe Chemicals Act, H.R. 4308, 109th Cong. § 2(b)(2)(C) (2005). 
 118. See American Chemistry Council Statement on the Kid Safe Chemical 
Act, May 21, 2008 (describing some Kid-Safe Chemicals Act provisions as 
“impractical” and “duplicative”). 
 119. S. 1391 § 501(a)(1); H.R. 4308 § 501(a)(1). 
 120. See Applegate, supra note 69, at 745–46. 
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appearance of safety to the chemical industry without actually 
ensuring that the products of the industry are reliable and safe. 
This Note has shown that the most important step of 
effective TSCA reform is an overhaul of the inventory that 
describes the chemicals that are in use in the United States 
today. The inventory must be rebuilt from the ground up, 
including only those chemicals that are actually in use, and the 
manufacturers of the chemicals should be the parties 
responsible for providing the data to populate the inventory. 
The resulting database will be complete and give a realistic 
picture of the health and safety risks of the chemicals in the 
inventory as they are actually used. By sharing the database 
with agencies, and state and international governments, we 
can increase the effectiveness of the TSCA and ensure that we 
are protected from dangerous chemicals. 
Congress continues to hold hearings on the TSCA and the 
EPA’s ability to regulate toxic substances. It seems that it is 
only a matter of time until sweeping reforms are brought to the 
TSCA. Effective reform must incorporate some method of 
resetting the inventory and closing the toxic data gap. A well-
crafted reform will greatly improve the safety of Americans and 
encourage invention of safer substitutes for dangerous 
chemicals. Public knowledge of the health risks of individual 
chemicals will encourage manufacturers to use safer 
alternatives, and reward companies who provide safer 
products. Increased cooperation with other agencies, and state, 
local, and international governments will improve the quality 
of our toxic substances inventory. The road to reform may take 
years, but it is important to take the time now to reform an act 
that at its inception in 1976 was already out of date. 
